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McDowell and Merleau-Ponty on the Cartesian Picture of the Mind
Dr Rasmus Thybo Jensen (Center for Subjectivity Research, University of Copenhagen)
Introduction
Recently a number of authors have appealed to the early works of Merleau-Ponty in a critique of the
picture of perception presented by McDowell. This debate has been focused on McDowell’s claim
that conceptual capacities are essentially involved in our perceptual experiences.1 In this paper I
wish to draw attention to what I consider an additional potentially fruitful meeting point between
the philosophies of Merleau-Ponty and McDowell, namely their critique of a certain Cartesian
picture of the mind. My aim is to demonstrate how both authors regard a certain conception of
nature rather than some independent epistemological project as the background assumption which
gives the Cartesian picture its attraction. Furthermore I want to bring out how they share a general
conception of the nature of the problem generated by this background assumption. They both regard
the problem as a transcendental problem as opposed to a merely epistemological problem. The
problem is transcendental in the sense that it is a problem concerning the very possibility of
empirical content rather than simply a problem about the possibility of knowledge. These
formulations owe more to McDowell than to Merleau-Ponty, but I shall argue that they do indeed
capture an outlook shared by both thinkers
When I highlight the similarities between McDowell and Merleau-Ponty this is not
because I believe that there are no substantial differences. On the contrary, I highlight similarities
because I believe it to be crucial for further exploration of the disagreements that we recognize this
background of shared concerns. It is exactly the presence of such shared concerns that makes the
comparison of the two philosophers’s respective accounts a promising approach to the problems in
question.
1. The Fully Cartesian Picture of the Mind
Merleau-Ponty characterizes the Cartesian conception of the mind as one that demarcates the mind
as an area of being where the distinction between appearance and reality finds no foothold (PP, p.
340, p. 387, p. 432).2 This is what McDowell calls the fully Cartesian picture of the mind, where the
mind is conceived as ‘a realm of reality in which sameness and differences are exhaustively
determined by how things seem to the subject’ (McDowell 1998a, p. 249). The strongest version
of the Cartesian picture is characterized by a commitment to what I shall call the Transparency
Thesis:
The Transparency Thesis: Any conscious experience is immediately given to the subject in a way
that makes all intrinsic features of the experience available to be known in a non-inferentially and
infallible way.
1 See the forthcoming collection of essays on the McDowell-Dreyfus debate (Schear 2012). Earlier critics of McDowell
inspired by Merleau-Ponty include: Kelly (2001), Taylor (2004) and Wrathall (2004). Authors who suggest a more
reconciliatory approach include Elpidorou 2008, Dwyer 2008 and Berendzen 2010.
2 All references to Merleau-Ponty’s Phénoménologie de la perception (1945) are indicated with “PP”.
2The traditional name for the special way intrinsic features of experiences are, according to the
Transparency Thesis, available to the subject undergoing the experience is “introspection”. I take it
to be an expression of the Transparency Thesis when Merleau-Ponty writes that according to the
Cartesian view nothing can be in consciousness without it being known in an absolute way and that
everything that is known in this way belongs to consciousness (PP, p. 387). Everything that belongs
to the experience qua experience is knowable in an infallible way via introspection and everything
that is known via introspection belongs to the experience as such.
The Transparency Thesis can be regarded as a certain interpretation of what according
to McDowell is one of Descartes’s genuine contributions to philosophy, namely the idea that the
way things appear to a subject constitutes a realm of facts and furthermore facts to which the
subject has a certain privileged access (McDowell 1998a, p, 242). The idea of such a region of facts
constituted by how things appear to us does not yet constitute the fully Cartesian picture of the
mind. To reach the fully Cartesian picture we need to add the further thesis that what belongs
intrinsically to our conscious mind cannot exceed that which is available in such an introspective
and possibly infallible fashion.
The fully Cartesian picture of the mind doesn’t necessarily involve a commitment to
the above strong version of the transparency thesis which lays claim to infallible knowledge. A
weaker version of the transparency thesis could be formulated as follows: Any feature of an
experience that belongs intrinsically to the experience is immediately, i.e. non-inferentially
accessible to the subject of the experience, and this special access is available independently of any
access to the outer world. This would still be a version of the fully Cartesian picture of the mind
because the introspective accessibility is regarded as the defining feature of everything that belongs
intrinsically to the mental. As we shall see McDowell explicitly argues that it is not the strong
transparency thesis which is the main problem with Cartesianism and I shall argue that Merleau-
Ponty’s arguments also have a broader target. First, however, I wish to make clear how acceptance
of the Transparency Thesis easily leads to the Cartesian predicament traditionally thought of as a
skeptical problem about the possibility of knowledge.
2. McDowell on the Argument from Illusion
McDowell highlights how certain epistemic versions of the so called arguments from illusion and
from hallucination become close to irresistible once the fully Cartesian picture is combined with a
further thesis which I shall call the Indistinguishability Thesis (McDowell 1998a, pp. 240-241;
1998b, p. 382, p. 386).
The Indistinguishability Thesis: For any genuine, veridical experience of a real, mind-independent
object there is a possible experience which would be, from the subject’s point of view,
indistinguishable from the actual experience, but which would fail to present the subject with an
opportunity to know the things the genuine experience makes available, either because this possible
experience would be a case of a sensory illusion or because it would be a case of a perceptual
hallucination.3
3 I shall use the term “genuine experience” to make a contrast with illusory and hallucinatory experiences. I take the
notion of a genuine experience to be neutral between a disjunctivist and a non-disjunctivist conception of experience. If
one denies that an experience could intrinsically be a world-revealing experience, one can still operate with the notion
of a genuine experience as a notion that covers for instance the kind of experiences implicated in an actual seeing of
something.
3The argument from illusion starts with the basic observation that sometimes we are placed in a
situation where the seen object (I shall stick to vision as my example throughout), say a red cube,
appears differently from the way it actually is, say as pink, and that in such cases we may, as we
undergo the experience, not be able to distinguish it from one in which we actually would be seeing
a pink cube. The argument from hallucination adds that it is even possible that it could visually
seem to us that we perceive a red cube under circumstances where no real object is present to us. If
we combine the possibility of illusions and hallucinations with the Transparency Thesis, it
immediately follows that it cannot be intrinsic to the experience involved in my seeing a red cube
that there is in fact a red cube visually present to me. I’m obviously not infallible when it comes to
knowing whether I’m actually seeing or whether it merely seems to me that I’m seeing. This is what
the possibility of illusions and hallucinations illustrates. Therefore it cannot be a part of what
belongs to the experience qua experience that it reveals a real, existing object to us. Had such a
revelatory relation to the real object been an intrinsic feature of the experience qua experience, then
we should have been able to know infallibly about each instance of a seeing that it is a seeing, since
the mind is, ex hypothesi, utterly self-disclosing. Any relation to the cube itself must therefore be
entirely external to my subjective experience.
In so far as we accept the epistemic, internalist intuition that if something is to be a
part of my justification for a judgement then that something cannot be entirely external to my
subjectivity (McDowell 1998b, p. 374, p. 390), it now follows that the justificatory potential of an
experience which is involved in a case of seeing cannot exceed the potential which would be
possessed by an indistinguishable experience which merely seems to be a genuine perception. We
have reached what McDowell calls the highest common factor model (McDowell 1998b, p. 386, p.
388). On this view how any genuine perception can factor in our epistemic accounting is
determined by the highest epistemic value it can share with an illusory or even a hallucinatory
experience. This places us in the familiar Cartesian predicament. In order to entitle ourselves to any
observational judgement we have to come up with a justification that starts with something less than
truth-entailing reasons such as “I see that there is a red cube in front of me”. The highest common
factor view rules out the legitimacy of such factive reasons. Our experientially given starting point
is thought of as something which could be available even in a case where there is no object to be
perceived, namely as the fact that it seems to us that there is an object in front of us.
In the next section I present the way McDowell tries to block the argument from
illusion via his so called disjunctive conception of experience.
3. McDowell’s Disjunctive Conception of Experience
McDowell’s disjunctive conception of perceptual appearances is an attempt to show that one can
accept the Cartesian idea that the way things appear to a subject constitutes a realm of facts to
which the subject has a certain privileged access, and furthermore accept the Indistinguishability
Thesis, without thereby being forced to accept the highest common factor view. Instead of
regarding the retreat to appearances as a retreat to a realm of facts that is self-disclosed and self-
enclosed, perceptual appearances are to be understood disjunctively. Whenever we have a case of a
perceptual appearance, such an appearance is either constituted by a worldly object making itself
manifest to the subject, or it is a mere appearance, i.e. an illusion or a hallucination. Here is how
McDowell formulates his disjunctivism:
“Short of the fully Cartesian picture, the infallibly knowable fact – it seeming to one that
things are thus and so – can be taken disjunctively, as constituted either by the fact
4that things are manifestly thus and so or by the fact that that merely seems to be the case.”
(McDowell 1998a, p. 242)
We can formulate disjunctivism as the following general thesis:
The disjunctive account of perceptual appearances (“disjunctivism”): Whenever you have a
perceptual appearance as of an object, then this experience is qua experience, i.e. solely by virtue of
features that belong intrinsically to the experience, either a case of a genuine experience actually
presenting you with real features of an existing object or it is a mere seeming to undergo such a
genuine experience, i.e. it is an illusion or a hallucination.
What the disjunctive account makes apparent is that there is no valid inference from the
Indistinguishability Thesis and the idea of a realm of facts concerning how things seem to one, to
the conclusion that our perceptually given epistemic starting point is limited to that which is also
available in the case of an illusion or a hallucination. It is true that the inference can go through if
we add the Transparency Thesis. However, the possibility of an epistemic retreat to appearances
available both in cases of illusions and in cases of actually seeing, doesn’t in itself establish the
necessity of reestablishing our contact with the world from an in principle world-impoverished
experience.
It is at this point that McDowell presents his diagnosis of the deeper commitments
which motivate the Transparency Thesis. According to McDowell part of the attraction of the
Transparency Thesis stems from the idea that the relation between mind and world must be
susceptible to the kind of explanations provided by natural science (McDowell 1998a, p. 243,
1998b, p. 391). If we accept the view that the natural world can be exhaustibly explained by natural
scientific means, i.e. what McDowell calls scientistic naturalism, and furthermore accept that causal
interaction between mind and world is possible, then it is natural to think that the mind must be a
self-standing realm of reality. This is so because natural scientific explanations are characterized by
a conception of the items to be explained as standing in merely causal relations to one another and
such causal relations are thought of as external to the items placed in such relations. Once this
“objectifying mode of conceiving reality” (McDowell 1998b, p. 393) is extended to the mind, the
otherwise innocent Cartesian idea of an inner realm of facts about appearances becomes the idea of
a realm of facts that exhausts the reality of the mental.
4. McDowell’s Negative Transcendental Argument
For McDowell the problem with the highest common factor view is not just that it embarrasses us
epistemologically. What is at stake is not just whether we can have knowledge about the world but,
as McDowell puts it, the very idea of “subjectivity as a mode of being in the world” (McDowell
1998a, p. 242). This is where we find what I shall refer to as McDowell’s negative transcendental
argument. He argues that that unless we can make sense of what he takes, I think rightly, to be a
completely natural and intuitive idea of perceptual experience, namely as at its best making
aspects of objective reality immediately present to us (McDowell 2010, p. 245), we will
fail to make sense of experiences so much as seeming to make reality present to us
(McDowell 1996, p. 112, n. 2, 1998a, p. 243, 1998b, p. 389, 1998c, pp. 409-410, 2009, p.
230). McDowell doesn’t spell out the argument in much detail, but the basic idea is the
following: If we are to make sense of the idea of an experience as merely seeming to be a
seeing, we need an intelligible conception of what it is the experience merely appears to
be. Here is how McDowell formulates the basic idea:
5“Experiences in which it merely looks to one as if things are thus and so are experiences that
misleadingly present themselves as belonging to that epistemically distinguished class. So we need
the idea of experiences that belong to the epistemically distinguished class if we are to comprehend
the idea that experiences have objective purport. If one acknowledges that experiences have
objective purport, one cannot consistently refuse to make sense of the idea of experiences in which
objective facts are directly available to perception.” (McDowell 2009, p. 230)
With this negative transcendental claim McDowell claims to have pinpointed the often
unrecognized radical character of modern skepticism which since Descartes has occupied
philosophers. The Cartesian picture not only makes empirical knowledge unattainable, it
undermines the very idea perceptual appearances, because it cannot make sense of the possibility of
direct, perceptual confrontation with how things are. With his disjunctive account McDowell claims
to have provided a way out of this Cartesian predicament.
What I want to do in the remaining sections of this paper is to reconstruct some of
Merleau-Ponty’s arguments against the fully Cartesian picture of the mind, in order to demonstrate
that not only does Merleau-Ponty share McDowell’s diagnosis concerning the role of scientistic
naturalism, he also provides his own version of the negative transcendental argument.
5. Merleau-Ponty’s Dilemma
I propose that we reconstruct Merleau-Ponty’s critique of the fully Cartesian picture in terms of a
dilemma. The dilemma starts with the following disjunction: Either it is intrinsic to a genuine
perception (vrai perception, PP, p. 341) qua experience that it is a truth-revealing experience
(perception vrai, PP, p. 341, p. 387) or it is not.4 It is when this disjunction is combined with the
Transparency Thesis that the dilemma Merleau-Ponty spells out arises (PP, pp. 340-344, pp. 386-
397). The first horn of the dilemma is a consequence of the acceptance of the idea that genuine
perception is intrinsically world-revealing and this option is taken by what Merleau-Ponty
sometimes refers to as rationalism or intellectualism. It amounts to disjunctivism on Cartesian
terms. The second horn is chosen when one denies the disjunctive conception of appearances but
maintains the Transparency Thesis. This second option leads directly to the highest common factor
view, and it is this view that Merleau-Ponty discusses under the heading of empiricism or
skepticism (PP, pp. 341-342).
On the surface Merleau-Ponty’s analysis seems utterly incongruent with that of
McDowell.  Merleau-Ponty’s Cartesian is committed to the strong transparency thesis, but she is
furthermore committed to a disjunctive account of experience since she affirms an
epistemologically relevant intrinsic difference between a truth-revealing perception and illusions
(PP, p. 340). In contrast McDowell’s portrays the Cartesian Transparency Thesis as going hand in
hand with the highest common factor view and opposes the Cartesian picture exactly with a
disjunctive account. I think these differences are superficial. If we look more closely at the way
Merleau-Ponty spells out the line of thought that leads to Cartesian intellectualism we can recognize
how the position comes about as a recoil from the skepticism that the argument from illusion lands
us in; a skepticism which is here represented by Merleau-Ponty’s empiricist. The Cartesian
intellectualist can be seen as someone who recognizes the fatal consequences of accepting the
Transparency Thesis in conjunction with the Indistinguishability Thesis, and who bites the bullet
4 In his German translation Rudolf Boehm helpfully notes that “perception vrai” here means something like a perception
that announces a truth (eine “Wahres bekundende Wahrnehmung”) and “vrai perception” means a genuine perception
(eine “echte Wahrnehmung”) (Merleau-Ponty 1966, p. 342).
6and denies the possibility of illusions and hallucinations that are subjectively indistinguishable from
genuine perceptual experiences. Merleau-Ponty himself sometimes portrays the two horns of the
dilemma as a matter of either holding on to the Transparency Thesis or of giving it up (PP, p. 341).
Here he works with the assumption that the Transparency Thesis implies the idea that genuine
perception differs in essence from illusions and hallucinations (PP, p. 340, p. 387). I think this
assumption is simply wrong and that we can relieve Merleau-Ponty from making it while remaining
true to the essence of his dilemma. The assumption is wrong exactly because, as we have seen, the
highest common factor view is a position that can combine the Transparency Thesis with a denial of
disjunctivism.
6. The First Horn of Merleau-Ponty’s Dilemma
According to Merleau-Ponty’s Cartesian intellectualist what Descartes discovered was
consciousness as a region of being where appearance and reality coincide. The intellectualist draws
the consequence that the truth or falsity of an experience cannot depend on a relation to some
exterior reality, because if it did neither the veridicality nor the deceiving character of any
experience would be recognizable from the subjects point of view (PP, p. 387). The intellectualist
insists that it must be possible to read off the truth or falsity of an experience from an “intrinsic
denominator” (PP, p. 387). Part of the motivation behind this rather odd combination of the
transparency thesis and a denial of the highest common factor model is the idea that it must be in
principle possible for us to become aware of our genuine perceptions qua genuine perception and of
our illusions qua illusions. Without such a possibility any addition of a new experience, possibly
from another sense modality, could not serve to either confirm or disconfirm previous experience
and empirical knowledge would become impossible (PP, p. 340). What we see here is how the
intellectualist realizes that an acceptance of the Indistinguishability Thesis will, given a
commitment to the Transparency Thesis, result in a watering down of all apparent perceptual
evidence to the epistemic value of mere appearances (simple appearance, PP, p. 457).
After presenting the intellectualist’s position Merleau-Ponty is quick to point out some
unfortunate consequences of its forced marriage between the disjunctive account and the
Transparency Thesis. The basic problem is that illusions and hallucinations, as interruptions of the
self-transparency of consciousness, are on this account rendered unthinkable (PP, p. 55, n. 2, p.
388). An illusion does not present itself as what it is, but on the contrary presents itself as what it is
not, namely as a world-disclosing perception (PP, p. 341). But if this is an intrinsic feature of the
illusion qua conscious experience and if the mind is utterly transparent to itself, then this feature
ought to be immediately accessible to the subject undergoing the illusion and it becomes a serious
question how illusions could ever mislead us. This argument is basically an inverse version of the
argument of illusion presented above. The argument from illusion assumes the Transparency
Thesis, then invokes the possibility of illusions and hallucination, and concludes that the world-
disclosing character of a genuine experience cannot be an intrinsic feature of the experience.
Merleau-Ponty’s argument against intellectualism turns this argument around: the intellectualist’s
denial of the common factor view in conjunction with her adherence to the Transparency Thesis
forces her to deny the possibility of illusions and hallucinations.
7. The Second Horn of Merleau-Ponty’s Dilemma
If we hold on to the Transparency Thesis the alternative is to return to the second horn of the
dilemma and accept that qua conscious experience there is no essential difference between genuine
perceptions on the one hand and illusions and hallucinations on the other hand (PP, p. 388).
7According to Merleau-Ponty the problem with this position is that it now becomes possible that any
appearance, independently of how distinct and clear it is, can be a case of a deceiving appearance
(PP, p. 341). It is because of this consequence that Merleau-Ponty concludes that we have made the
phenomenon of truth impossible (PP, p. 341). This can sound as if it is simply the acceptance of the
Indistinguishability Thesis which according to Merleau-Ponty creates the problem. I don’t think the
crucial problem Merleau-Ponty pinpoints is created by such an acceptance alone. Rather, it results
from the further assumption that the indistinguishable appearances are mere appearances in the
sense of being compatible with the non-existence of the ostensibly perceived object. Here follows
my reasons for thinking so.
In the Cogito-chapter as well as in other sections of Phénoménologie de la perception
Merleau-Ponty presents what can (wrongly, according to him) appear to be the only alternative to
Cartesian intellectualism as an empiricist or a naturalistic account of experiences (PP, p. 387, p.
428, p. 454). Empiricism starts with a conception of nature as consisting of items that exist partes
extra partes and consequently only allows for external or merely causal relations between items in
the empirical world (PP, p. 49, p. 87). This “naturalism of science” (PP, p. 68) holds that the only
conceivable type of being is the one defined by scientific method and as such it coincides with the
position McDowell refers to as scientistic naturalism. For the empiricist the natural world is
typically conceived as the totality of spatio-temporal events standing in merely causal
relations (PP, p. 50). The empiricist conceives of the impression of seeing as a result of the
irritation of certain sections of the nervous system and hallucinations are to be explained by
irritation of the parts of the brain that are involved in a normal seeing (PP, p. 386). It follows that
for the empiricist our apparently immediate awareness of seeing can be no more than a mere
impression of seeing, i.e. a passive noticing of a mental event closed upon itself (PP, pp. 430-431).
The event is closed upon itself in the same sense that the facts about appearances are self-standing
according to the fully Cartesian picture described by McDowell: the occurrence of the event is
compatible with the non-existence of the ostensibly seen object. Here we see the motivation for the
highest common factor model stemming from an objectivistic outlook also noted by McDowell; a
motivation which is not as such dependent on a commitment to the Transparency Thesis
(McDowell, 1998a, p. 250). The result is, according to Merleau-Ponty, that our perceptual evidence,
what he also refers to as the phenomenon of being or the phenomenon of truth (PP, p. 455, p. 341),
is degraded to the level of mere appearance (simple appearance, PP, p. 455). What is ruled out is
exactly what Merleau-Ponty takes be the genuine insight of Cartesian intellectualism, namely that
the relation between perception and its object consists in more than a merely external relation (PP,
p. 428). We should now be able to see how, according to Merleau-Ponty, the crucial problem with
the empiricist alternative is not the mere acceptance of the Indistinguishability Thesis, but rather the
fact that we have accepted that a hallucination is nothing but a perception without an existing object
and that a perception of a real object is simply a veridical hallucination (PP, p. 340). In other words
the problem is the highest common factor view.
8. Merleau-Ponty’s Diagnosis
The empiricist is portrayed by Merleau-Ponty as someone who holds on to the idea of an infallible
knowledge about sense impressions conceived as events closed upon themselves. Such knowledge
about impressions always leaves it an open question whether anything in reality corresponds to how
things seem to the subject (PP, pp. 431). What should be evident by now is that what according to
Merleau-Ponty lies at the root of the problems of empiricism is not the assumption of such infallible
knowledge, but rather the idea that perceptual experience is only externally related to the outer
world. Like McDowell, Merleau-Ponty traces this conception of the relation between mind and
8world back to what they both consider a metaphysical prejudice, namely scientistic naturalism.
Merleau-Ponty regards such a conception of the empirical world formed in the image of science as
the shared background assumption of both intellectualism and empiricism (PP, p. 55). As he
repeatedly points out the intellectualist does not challenge the empiricist’s idea of nature or being,
but simply insists that this idea of nature must be made intelligible by reference to the a priori
structures of the mind. In the case of the Cartesian intellectualist this prioritizing of the mind is
taken to the extreme, and the dualism of mind and world is overcome by letting the mind swallow
up the world (cf. PP, p. 431). I have suggested that we should regard Merleau-Ponty’s Cartesian
disjunctivist as someone who recoils from the empiricist position to avoid the isolation of the mind
from the world. This allows us to make sense of the extreme consequences that the Cartesian
intellectualist draws from the Transparency Thesis as a desperate attempt to avoid the empiricist’s
separation from the world.
In the next section I will show how Merleau-Ponty shares McDowell’s
characterization of the basic problem of the Cartesian picture as a problem concerning the very
possibility of intentionality and how Merleau-Ponty presents his own version of McDowell’s
negative transcendental argument.
9. Merleau-Ponty’s Negative Transcendental Argument
That Merleau-Ponty shares McDowell conception of the nature of the basic problem of the
Cartesian picture of the mind is made explicit when he writes as follows:
“To say that, in consciousness, appearance and reality are one, or that they are separate, is to rule
out consciousness of anything whatsoever, even as appearance.” (PP, p. 342/Merleau-Ponty 2005,
p. 296)
The view that takes appearance and reality to collapse in consciousness is Cartesian intellectualism.
The view that is said to separate them is the empiricist position. Both of these will, according to
Merleau-Ponty, not only undermine the idea of empirical knowledge but do so by undermining the
very idea of consciousness of anything. Even the idea of an appearance of an awareness of
something real is undermined.
Merleau-Ponty argues that we can only makes sense of our talk about illusions
because we have recognized illusions as such and that such recognition in turn could only take place
in the name of experiences which at the very same moment attest to their own truth (PP, p. xi) and
through which we possess truths (PP, 341).  He further claims that the Cartesian thought about a
seeing which restricts itself to the claim that it seems to me that I see, implies that we have had the
experience of an authentic or actual visual experience in which the certainty of the object was
encompassed (PP, p. 430). Why couldn’t a skeptic simply respond that just because we need to have
had experiences where we indeed took it for granted that they presented us with a real object, this
doesn’t show that we were entitled to such take such certainty for granted? Let us look closer at
Merleau-Ponty’s argument here. The basis of this argument is the thought that the withdrawal to
claims about appearances is basically a redraw to a merely hypothetical statement, i.e. to a
statement about what is possible or probable (PP, p. 430). To state about an actual experience of
mine that it appears to me as a seeing of a red cube, is to state that things appear to me just as they
would if I would in fact be seeing a red cube in front of me. In other words it is to state that judging
from its appearance alone this experience might be a case of seeing. However, in order to be able to
meaningfully make such a statement about an actual experience, I must presuppose knowledge
about what it would be like if I was actually seeing. The question is now where such knowledge
9could come from if not from an actual experience of seeing. The problem is that on the empiricist
picture we are supposed to make sense of what McDowell calls the most perspicuous of all
phenomenological facts (McDowell, 1998a, p. 243), namely the fact that perception presents
itself as presenting me with the world itself, while at the same time claiming that no experience
could in reality constitute such a direct presentation of how things are. What we see here is how
Merleau-Ponty, like McDowell, makes the negative transcendental claim that we need an
intelligible notion of a genuine experience which is in fact as it seems, namely a case of being
directly presented with how things are in the world, if we are to make sense of ourselves as
undergoing experiences which resemble such world-revealing experiences. Furthermore, like
McDowell he claims that the basic failure of the fully Cartesian picture of the mind is that it cannot
live up to this transcendental requirement and thereby renders the very idea of perceptual
appearances unintelligible.
Concluding Remarks
My purpose in this paper has not been to evaluate the validity of the diagnostic approach shared by
McDowell and Merleau-Ponty, nor has it been to evaluate the validity of their respective versions of
what I have called the negative transcendental argument. My purpose has been the more limited one
of demonstrating the considerable overlap between the philosophical outlooks of the two authors.
They both regard the problem generated by the Cartesian picture of the mind as a transcendental
problem concerning the very notion of intentionality, and they both trace this problem back to
certain background assumption about what can count as part of the natural world. I believe that
recognition of these shared concerns is a prerequisite for establishing a further critical dialogue.
Some of the more specific questions that come into focus once this background of shared concerns
is recognized are the following: Can McDowell’s rather brief statements of the negative
transcendental argument be reinforced by the more elaborate version found in Merleau-Ponty? Does
Merleau-Ponty’s explicit recognition of the value of the disjunctive account of the Cartesian
intellectualist indicate that he is himself committed to a version of disjunctivism? If so, does
Merleau-Ponty follow the Cartesian intellectualist in denying the Indistinguishability Thesis? I shall
not attempt to answer these questions here, but I hope to have demonstrated why we have reason to
believe that a comparative analysis of McDowell and Merleau-Ponty can cast new light on their
respective philosophies as well as on the problems they address.
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